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Australia’s Cash Economy: Are the estimates credible?
∗ 
 
I  Introduction 
  Policymakers and citizens in Australia are alarmed by research findings that unreported 
cash transactions might be funding an underground economy as large as 15 per cent of official 
GDP. The figure comes from a series of works by Christopher Bajada, including an article in 
the Economic Record (1999), a report for the Australian Tax Research Foundation (2001) and a 
research monograph (2002). All three of these works use the same method and contain the same 
core analytical material, and report the same 15 per cent result, although the focus and the time 
periods differ slightly. Another recent article in the Economic Record, (Bajada 2003), takes the 
earlier results as given and explores the business cycle properties of the underground economy. 
These research findings and their implications for social and economic policy have been given 
considerable attention in newspapers and the electronic media.
1 
  The reasons for concern about unobserved economic activity will differ between agencies, 
depending on their areas of responsibility and the nature of the activity. The Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), which is responsible for compiling national income accounts, believes it 
has computed GDP to within 1 or 2 per cent of accuracy (ABS, 2004). Against this confidence, 
15 per cent of unrecorded income would be a considerable embarrassment. However if the 
underground economy arises from activity that is itself illegal, it doesn’t count as GDP in the 
ABS definition. But then the Australian Taxation Office is charged with taxing incomes and the 
sales of goods and services, regardless of whether the underlying activity is legal. Unreported 
income to the extent of 15 per cent of GDP represents a large slice of lost tax revenue. To 
political leaders and citizens alike, it is unfair if some people are evading taxation and 
regulation, at the expense of others who are complying with the law. Enforcement authorities at 
state and federal levels may see unreported income as a marker of criminal behaviour that needs 
to be investigated. Apart from the revenue and distributional implications of large-scale tax 
evasion, the Australian Treasury and Reserve Bank of Australia are concerned about 
                                                 
∗ I thank the Associate Editor and the referees for their advice on an earlier version of this paper. Several 
colleagues also made helpful comments on a draft, and I have benefitted from background discussions with the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts Branch. All remaining omissions and errors are mine alone. 
1 ‘Underground economy’ is the preferred term for those production activities that are themselves legal but are 
concealed from the authorities for the purpose of evading regulation or taxation (OECD, 2002). Other colourful 




misjudgment of economic policy if they rely on inaccurate national income data, particularly if 
the amount of unrecorded activity is changing over time.  
   Many approaches have been used to estimate the extent of underground economic activity 
around the world; see Schneider and Enste (2000) or Bajada (2002, Chapter 3) for surveys of 
this literature. One general class of methods is called the ‘currency demand’ method because it 
compares various macroeconomic aggregates to see if the amount of currency (that is, cash – 
notes and coins) in the hands of the public (that is, outside the banking system) depends on 
factors that suggest unreported income. Studies of the demand for money show that holdings in 
aggregate will depend on many factors, including the volume of transactions that has to be 
financed, the availability of other payment methods such as electronic transfers of bank 
balances, and the cost of interest income forgone by holding cash. After these factors are taken 
into account, there may be patterns over time in cash use that cannot be accounted for by the 
economic transactions that are observed by the authorities. According to the currency demand 
method this extra cash use constitutes evidence of unreported income. 
  In particular, it has been suggested that unobserved cash transactions might respond to 
incentives such as high income tax rates and high levels of welfare benefits. Thus Bajada uses 
the term ‘excess sensitivity’ to describe his particular version of the currency demand method. 
The points of departure in this approach are the way the response of public cash holdings to 
income tax rates and welfare payments is measured, and the steps that lead from a measure of 
sensitivity to an estimate of the relative size of the underground economy. However, we show 
that this method is unsound because it is sensitive to the units of measurement of the variables. 
A simple change in the units of the tax rate variable – from a percentage to a decimal fraction – 
will produce a vastly different inference about the size of the underground economy. We also 
consider modifying the method so that it is robust to such changes in the units of measurement, 
but find that the underground economy all but disappears in the robust procedure. 
  Even if we leave aside the problems in calculation of ‘excess sensitivity’, there is a crucial 
assumption in this work that is superficially attractive but utterly implausible. It is assumed that 
the amount of income in a year that is supported by a given stock of available cash is the same 
in the underground economy (where cash is the only form of money) as it is in the observed 
economy (where cash is but a very small part of the money supply). We explore the 
consequences of this assumption and find that, on this account alone, the estimated size of the 




II  Modelling currency holdings 
  The analysis of ‘excess sensitivity’ starts with an equation to represent the aggregate 
holding of currency in the economy, which is assumed to be homogeneous in prices and 
population
2 
  (, , , ,) Cf Y d RE T r π = , (B-1) 
where C is real currency per capita, Yd real disposable income per capita, R the interest rate, π  
the inflation rate, E private consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and Tr a 
technological trend. By definition of disposable income, Yd Y Tx Wf = −+ , where Y is national 
income (the same as GDP in this setting), Tx is taxes and Wf is welfare benefits (presumably 
both real, per capita). The model is then expanded so the tax and welfare variables are allowed 
a direct influence on currency holdings in addition to their impact through disposable income: 
  (, , , , , , ) Cf Y T x W f RE T x W f T r π =− + . (B-2) 
The term ‘excess sensitivity’ refers to the direct effects to Tx and Wf on C, at given levels of Yd 
and the other variables in the equation.  
  The estimation model for currency demand is written as linear in logs of real per capita 
variables and some ratios. These new ratio variables are T for the average income tax rate, 
constructed as a percentage of GDP, and W for welfare benefits as a percentage of disposable 
income. The model is estimated as an error correction regression, with one lag and one 
difference on all variables (except the welfare variable, which has only the first difference
3). 
Thus the empirical model takes the form 
 ln tt tt C β γε Δ=+ + XZ  .  (3) 
Here  t X  is a vector of 14 or 15 elements, namely the first difference and first lag of  ln t Yd , 
ln t R , ln t π , and ln t E . There is also a linear trend, three seasonal dummy variables, the lag of 
ln t C  and an intercept.
4 
5 Similarly,  t Z  is a vector of three elements, namely  ln t T Δ ,  1 ln t T −  and 
                                                 
2 Equation numbers shown as (B-n) match the numbering in Bajada (1999), but similar equations can be readily 
identified with different numbering in the other Bajada works. 
3 The absence of the lag of the welfare variable is not explained. 
4 Equation (3) is (B-4) in our condensed notation. In (2001) and (2002) there is an additional dummy variable to 
indicate the introduction of GST in July 2000, while in (2001) the tax variable is split into tax on households and 




ln t W Δ . The reason for the partition into two subsets of explanatory variables,  t X  and  t Z , will 
be seen shortly. This model is estimated by least squares. In Bajada (1999) the data are 
quarterly, not seasonally adjusted, and cover the period from June 1966 to June 1996. 
III  Excess sensitivity 
  The expositions in Bajada (1999, 2001, 2002) describe the extraction of ‘excess sensitivity’ 
from a rearrangement of the estimation model. First, the model is rewritten with the dependent 
variable being nominal currency holdings, CP N C ∗ = ××, where P is the price level (taken to 
be the implicit GDP deflator), and N is population. Then some variables are shifted to the right 
hand side of equation (3), by use of the relationship  ln ln ln ln tt tt CC P N ∗ Δ= Δ + Δ + Δ  where 
also  *** 1 ln ln ln ttt CCC − Δ=− . This results in the rearrangement of (3) as 
 ln tt t t C β γε ∗ =+ +   XZ    (4) 
where  t  X  is an expanded vector that now includes  * 1 ln t C − , ln t P Δ  and  ln t N Δ , and where β   
has been expanded to match. 
  ‘Excess sensitivity’ refers to the additional effect on nominal currency holdings  t C∗ that is 
attributable to the tax and welfare variables, which in our notation are contained in the vector 
t Z . Bajada follows Tanzi (1982, 1983) in calculating the difference between two predictions of 
currency holdings. First, a prediction is made from (4) of total currency given the data in  t  X  
and  t Z . The formula for this prediction is obtained by dropping the error term and 
exponentiating both sides to yield
6 
  { } exp tt t C β γ ∗ =+   XZ . (5) 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 This representation of the interest rate R and the inflation rate π in logarithmic form is a questionable practice, 
since these variables usually arise as discount rates in the exponents of multiplicative models and hence go into 
their natural form when the model is linearized. The log transformation on the inflation rate can be problematic 
with recent data because the quarter-on-quarter changes in the implicit GDP deflator are sometimes negative.  
6 Equation (5) is (B-5) in our condensed notation. Although it may be intuitive, the form of predictor is 
questionable. Under standard assumptions on the error term, this formula with the least-squares estimates replacing 
the parameters is not the best predictor, nor even an unbiased predictor, in the log-linear regression model. See 




Then a second prediction is made after dropping the term  tα Z , which contains the tax and 
welfare variables. The result is called the ‘natural’ or ‘legal’ level of currency, and is written as
7 
  { } exp wt t C β ∗ =   X . (6) 
The difference between total currency in (5) and ‘legal’ currency in (6) is called underground or 
‘illegal’ currency, and is 
  * ut C { } { } () exp exp 1 tt βγ =×−   XZ , (7)   
where  ** * ut t wt CC C =−  is a different symbol from the original but preferred because it is more 
effective as a mnemonic. 
IV  Underground income 
  The connection between illegal currency and unobserved income is made through an 
assumption about the velocity of circulation, which is the ratio of the flow of income in a year 
to the stock of money. Velocity in Bajada is measured for observed net national income, NNI, 
which is represented by  * Y . The reason for using NNI instead of GDP here is the reasonable 
one that ‘both consumption of fixed capital and net income paid overseas are most likely to 
involve very small amounts of cash’ (Bajada, 1999, footnote 23, p.337).
8 The velocity of 
observed net national income in legal currency is  ** ttw t VYC = . 
  Now comes the key assumption. Velocity of income in the underground economy relative 
to illegal currency is assumed to be equal to velocity of income in the observed economy 











                                                 
7 Equation (6) is (B-6) in our condensed notation. 
8 NNI in Australia is on average just over 80 per cent of GDP, varying in the annual data between 79 and 84 per 




where we use the symbol  * ut Y  for underground income to match  * ut C  for underground currency.
9   
Rearranging (8) gives an expression for underground income, as follows 
  *** * () ut t ut wt YYC C =× . (9) 
Then, with substitution from (6) and (7), the underground economy as a proportion of observed 
GDP is evaluated as 
  {} ()
** * *
*






γ == × = × − Z . (10) 
Equation (10) is not needed to implement the method (and not reported as an equation in the 
original studies), since the estimation can be achieved by numerically manipulating the two 
series of predicted currency holdings, together with the series for recorded income, as in 
expression (9). But (10) is useful for our purpose, because it allows the original results to be 
replicated without revisiting the regression analysis in any detail. All that are needed to evaluate 
the estimate in this form are a few variables from the national accounts and the γ  coefficients 
from the estimated regression model. 
V  Replicating the calculation 
  When the regression estimates reported in (1999, Table 3) are used to evaluate (10), the 
resulting percentage of GDP in underground income is calculated as 
  { } () 1 ˆ (NNI /GDP )* exp 0.061ln 0.183 ln 0.049 ln 1 *100 tt t t t t UT T W − =+ Δ − Δ − . (11) 
This formula can be evaluated using the data that are described in the Appendix. The results are 
shown in Figure 1 as two different plots. Direct calculation of (11) gives the extremely choppy 
plot, which clearly contains a large seasonal component – and a lot of irregular variation as 
well. Thus we see why a moving-average smoother is applied in the original studies ‘to reduce 
the volatile short-term fluctuations’ (Bajada, 1999, footnote 25, p.377). Applying a similar filter 
to our calculation gives the ‘smoothed’ plot in Figure 1.  
        << Figure 1 about here>> 
                                                 
9 Equation (8) summarizes (B-8) and the text immediately following that equation. Observe what might be 
considered an inconsistency in notation: observed currency  * t C  is total and hence includes the underground 




The smoothed plot appears very close to the one presented in Bajada (1999, Figure 2, p.377). 
Ours is at the same level, around 15 per cent of recorded GDP for most of the period; it has the 




  We can gain further insight into this method of estimating an underground economy by 
simplifying expression (11). The last term inside the braces,  0.049 ln t W − Δ , contributes less 
than 0.4 per cent to the value that is obtained for the underground economy, as measured by the 
average relative error when the term is dropped. If a smoothed time series was calculated 
without this term and plotted onto Figure 1 it would be difficult to distinguish the new line from 
the previous one. The second last term, 0.183 ln t T Δ , contributes more than that to the overall 
calculation, but dropping the two terms together makes only 1.3 per cent error. Put differently, 
the simplification 
  { } () 1 ˆ (NNI /GDP )* exp 0.061ln 1 *100 tt t t UT − ≈−  (12) 
captures 98.7 per cent of the original inference. This expression can be rewritten using the 
properties of logarithms as 
  ()
0.061
1 ˆ *1 tt t UKT − ≈− , (13) 
where  t K  is  t NNI  expressed as a percentage of  t GDP , a value that varies annually between 79 
and 84 per cent for the whole period. In a slightly different form, using the approximation 
1 x ex −≈  for small x, expression (13) may also be written approximately as 
  1 ˆ *0.061ln tt t UK T − ≈ . (14) 
Thus, from (13) or (14), apart from the almost constant 20 per cent discount in moving from 
GDP to NNI, with a small amount of variation in that discount factor from year to year, the 
principal driver of the inference about the underground economy by the method of ‘excess 
                                                 
10 The strong seasonality in the unfiltered series occurs despite some seasonal smoothing that has already been 
applied to the tax series on which the variable T is based. See the Appendix for a description of the data. Some 
readers may regard this residual seasonality, which is large relative to the phenomenon being measured, as a 
warning sign that the method is too reliant on irrelevant features of the data. Alternatively it might be argued (as by 
a referee) that it simply points to a less than satisfactory treatment of seasonality in the modelling. 
11 The filter is described as a ‘four-period centred moving average’ (Bajada, 1999, footnote 25, p.377), but it 
appears that a simple, four-period moving average is actually employed. The centred form (which covers five time 
points in a weighted pattern) induces too much smoothness, and does not match the original plot as well as the 




sensitivity’ is the income tax rate. As income tax as a percentage of GDP goes up and down, so 
will the inference about the underground economy. The two variables are tied together in a 
close mathematical relationship. 
VI  Sensitivity to units 
  One criterion of good analysis is that its findings are robust, which means that the results 
are not too much dependent on small changes in the assumptions that are central to the analysis, 
and are invariant to even large changes in any conditions that are peripheral to the system being 
analysed. In particular, relationships of substance are equally true or false in whatever units of 
measurements are chosen to describe them. The same substantive results must be obtained, for 
example, whether income is measured in thousands or millions of dollars, and whether tax rates 
are measured as percentages or decimal fractions. 
  Consider again Bajada’s model and suppose now that taxes are measured in different units, 
not as a percentage of GDP but as a fraction of GDP. So instead of being numbers like 15 or 20 
per cent, the tax rate is now a decimal like 0.15 or 0.20. Imagine that we are totally thorough 
about this change of units, adopting it at the start of the empirical analysis and maintaining it 
consistently through to the end. Nothing is different in equations (B-1) and (B-2) because these 
are theory equations, and in these equations tax is a quantum amount not a proportion of 
income. The issue of units will have an impact on the estimation model, such as shown in (3), 
which can expanded somewhat as 
  11 2 3 ln ln ln ln X β γγγ ε − Δ=+ + Δ + Δ+ tt t t t t CT T W . (15) 
If the new decimal variable is written as  d
t T  to distinguish it from the old percentage variable 
t T , the relationship is 100 d
tt TT ×= . In (15), the change of units implies  11 ln ln100 ln d
tt TT −− =+ 
and ln ln d
tt TT Δ= Δ . When the estimation model is written in the new units it becomes, 
  11 1 2 3 ln ln100 ln ln ln dd
tt t t t t CT T W γ βγ γ γ ε − Δ= ++ + Δ+ Δ+ X , (16) 
where the only thing changed is the intercept in the model. As expected, when the model is re-
estimated in the new measurement system, all the same coefficient estimates will be obtained, 
except the intercept will now be larger by an additional amount of  1ln100 γ  (about 4.61 times 




  Suppose now these new estimates are used to extract a measure of ‘excess sensitivity’ in 
the same manner as before. The change in the measurement unit and its consequences can be 
traced through equations (4)-(7). The only alterations will be replacement of  1 ln t T −  by  1 ln d
t T −  
in  t Z  and the addition of an amount of  1ln100 γ  to the value of the intercept in β  . In equation 
(10) all that is needed is the updated  1 ln d
t T − , since the intercept has cancelled from the 
expression for ‘excess sensitivity’. Similarly, the new computational formula (11) is the same 
as before but with the new decimal measure  1 ln d
t T −  in  t Z  in place of the old percentage 
measure  1 ln t T − .  
  But if this new version of (11) is computed and smoothed in the same manner as shown in 
Figure 1, the result is completely nonsensical. The values are all negative, in the range  
–8 to –11, and hence they make no sense at all when interpreted as the percentage of 
underground income in relation to GDP. We see that the calculation of the underground 
economy depends in an entirely arbitrary way on the units of measurement employed for the tax 
ratio variable. 
  What has gone wrong? The problem comes from measuring ‘excess sensitivity’ as the 
effect of dropping the term  tγ Z  in the predictor of currency holdings. Total currency in (5) is 
invariant to the change of units in T from percentages to proportions, because the replacement 
of  1 ln t T −  by  1 ln d
t T −  is exactly compensated by the addition of  1ln100 γ  to the value of the 
intercept in β  . But ‘legal’ currency in (6) is not invariant to the change, since it carries the new 
intercept but not the terms in T and W. The partition of total currency into ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ 
components is therefore dependent on the units of measurement adopted for T. This shows how 
the substantive result on the size of the underground economy is sensitive to the measurement 
system. 
  The origin of the problem is the ad hoc conception of ‘excess sensitivity’ that is employed. 
Simply dropping  tγ Z  from the predictor does not correspond to any meaningful setting of a 
counterfactual against which the extra currency used in the underground economy can be 
measured. It is clearly not the same operation as setting the tax and welfare rates to zero, as 
used in many other methods of estimating the underground economy (see, for example Tanzi, 
1982), since the logarithm of the zero is not defined. Neither is it the same as the setting the 
counterfactual to be some minimum values of these variables, perhaps a conceptual minimum 




describe a counterfactual world in which tax and welfare rates have no effect on currency 
demand, since in that case the predictor would be re-estimated from a model that excludes those 
explanatory variables.
12 
VII  A possible solution 
  The problem we have isolated arises because a change of the units of measurement alters 
the intercept in the equation as well as the term that measures ‘excess sensitivity’. This suggests 
a possible solution may be found in redefining the latter to include that part of the intercept that 
is affected. The intercept in a regression equation is nothing more than a linear combination of 
the means of the variables in the regression, with the regression slopes as the coefficients of the 
linear combination. This is so both in a theoretical expression of the model in terms of 
population parameters, and as a relation between the estimated coefficients and the sample 
means of the variables. It is an elementary result that fitting an intercept in a regression model is 
exactly the same as estimating the model with no intercept but with the variables transformed as 
deviations from their means. The intercept estimate can be recovered subsequently in a simple 
formula that relates the regression slopes and the sample means of the variables.
13 
  The advantage of the deviation-from-means formulation in the present context is the 
‘excess sensitivity’ term is then invariant to changes in the units of measurement. From (10) the 
calculation of the percentage of income in the underground economy will have the form 








γ =× −  Z , (17) 
where now  tt =−  ZZZ  contains the variables  ln t T Δ ,  1 ln t T −  and  ln t W Δ  all transformed into 
deviations from their sample means. The estimate of γ  will be the same as before, but now the 
change in units will be innocuous because the variables are in the form  1 ln ln t TT − − . Any 
change of the units of measurement of T is a multiplicative constant on T, which becomes an 
additive constant on both lnT  and its average. When the variables are formulated into 
deviations-from-means, the constants arising from the change of units will cancel, leaving the 
‘excess sensitivity’ term unaffected by the change. 
                                                 
12 Another indication of the ad hoc nature of ‘excess sensitivity’ is its dependence on only short-run or transient 
parameters in the regression model. Other approaches to measuring the underground economy from error-
correction models emphasise long-run solutions and the dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium; see Hill and Kabir 
(2000) and Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002). 




  It is therefore of some interest to evaluate the estimate of the underground economy in this 
modified form that is invariant to changes in units of measurement. Again this can be done 
from (10), using the same coefficient estimates, and with the same data for the variables apart 
from their transformation into deviations-from-means. The same smoothing is necessary to 
remove the high level of residual seasonality that was seen previously, and a similarly smooth 
result is obtained. The result is an estimate of the underground economy that varies between  
–1.5 per cent and +0.8 per cent of observed GDP. This estimate ranges from the illogical to the 
dubiously small. 
  Mathematically, this outcome is hardly a surprise. With the original definition of ‘excess 
sensitivity’, we noted above that the main driver of the inference about the underground 
economy is the variable  1 ln t T − . When T is measured as a percentage, a typical value is around 
15 T =  and hence the value of lnT  is around 2.7; in this case the inference is a large and 
positive underground economy. On the other hand, when T is measured as a decimal, a typical 
value is 0.15 and hence lnT  is around –1.9; in this case the underground economy is 
implausibly negative. The putative solution of mean correcting lnT  ensures that this variable is 
around zero, certainly on average, so it is not surprising that the inference is an underground 
economy that is sometimes negative and at most very small.  
VIII  A key assumption 
  Leaving aside the problems with the meaning and measurement of ‘excess sensitivity’, 
there is an assumption in this work that is key to the results, but so implausible that the 
estimates are incredible on that account alone. In moving from a measure of currency holdings 
to an estimate of underground income, a value is required for the velocity of circulation, i.e. the 
ratio of the amount of income in a year to the stock of money. In expression (10) it is clear that 
the estimated size of the underground economy is directly proportional to the value of velocity 
in the hidden sector. Also embodied in that calculation is the assumption that velocity in the 
underground sector is the same as the ratio of income to currency in the observed sector of the 
economy. 
  The assumption of equal velocities of currency in the two sectors is introduced on the 
grounds that ‘There is very little we can do about such an assumption’ (Bajada, 1999, footnote 
24, p.377). At least superficially, equal velocities seems a reasonable baseline assumption, a 
neutral one, and perhaps even a necessary one. However, demand for currency is not the same 




sectors. In the underground economy, cash is the only form of money that is available for 
settling transactions without leaving an audit trail, whereas cash has a much smaller role to play 
in the observed economy. The two ratios of income to currency will be very different in the two 
sectors, and hence the velocity that results from this hypothesis is both extreme and untenable. 
The implied value of velocity is also much higher than used in other literature that employs 
currency demand models to estimate the underground economy. The resulting estimate of 
underground activity is inflated in direct proportion to the inflated value of velocity. 
  In the underground cash economy, where currency is the only medium of exchange 
available to those who wish to conceal their transactions, the ratio of income to currency is 
close to the textbook idea of velocity. It is, for that sector, the ratio of the total flow of income 
to the total stock of money available for the settling of transactions. While the idea of velocity 
is clear enough in concept here, the issue in the underground economy is that neither the 
numerator nor the denominator of the ratio is readily measurable. But this velocity is not even 
conceptually the same as the ratio of income to currency in the observed economy. In the 
observed sector, cash is used in only a small fraction of the transactions, and the ratio of income 
to currency is nothing like total velocity of money in that sector. Cash is but a small part of total 
the money supply: in Australia in recent decades, currency has been only 6-9 per cent of M3 
money (and even less of that other measure recently favoured by the makers of monetary 
policy, ‘broad money’). Most transactions in the modern economy (at least in value) are not 
settled by cash, but instead by instructions to a banker in the form of a cheque, draft or 
electronic transfer. The dominance of the banks in the payment system is reflected in the 
relative amounts of currency and other forms of money in the community, in which there is 
many times more non-cash than cash. 
  What is called velocity of currency in the observed economy in expression (10) is the total 
of all observed income in a ratio to the stock of ‘legal’ currency that is employed in the 
observed economy. The ratio of observed NNI to total currency in the hands of the Australian 
public is in the range 21 to 26 over the period. So if 15 per cent of the currency on issue is 
being siphoned off to fund underground economic activity, as indicated by the estimates, the 
implied velocity of ‘legal’ currency in the recorded sector will be even higher by that 
proportion, therefore in the range 24-30. This is the assumption of velocity implicit in the 
calculations of an underground economy that is 15 per cent of official GDP. 
  A valid calculation of velocity of currency in the observed economy, to match the velocity 




that are actually settled in cash in a ratio to the stock of currency. While this would obviously 
yield a much lower number than the previous ratio, the calculation is impractical because the 
numerator of the calculation is not measured. An alternative simple assumption of ‘equal 
velocities’ would equate the total flow of income in each sector to the total stock of money 
available that sector, not just currency money. In Australia in recent decades the ratio of NNI to 
M3 money has been around 1.3 to 2.4, and more recently at the lower end of that range. (The 
effect of currency removed to the underground economy is negligible in this calculation.) 
  One way to justify this calculation is to imagine what the velocity of cash might be if there 
were only cash available for settling of transactions in an otherwise modern economy. A first 
approximation suggests that the velocity of cash in such a situation would have to be around the 
same level as the velocity of all money in the actual economy, i.e. of the order of two. It can be 
argued that that number is somewhat too high or too low. Since cash is less efficient than 
cheques or electronic transfers for large or distant transactions, perhaps even more cash would 
be required to support the same level of activity in our imaginary economy than the total of all 
forms of money today. Thus we might agree that two is perhaps too high a figure for the 
velocity of cash in a cash-only economy. On the other hand, some components of M3 are 
deposits that are not used in regular transactions, so on that account it is arguable that the figure 
is too low. 
  Velocity in the underground economy is similar in concept to our hypothetical cash-only 
economy, so a similar figure might be a good starting point for the value of velocity. Thus we 
may conjecture a value for that velocity also around two. The effect of non-transactions motives 
for holding cash may be even more dramatic in the underground sector than in the legal 
economy. Persons engaged in illicit earnings will avoid purchasing real property or non-money 
financial assets because they fear detection through these dealings, so they may choose to hold 
more of their assets in the form of money. Since the only money available to them is currency, 
their non-transactions demand for cash will be higher than that of legitimate income earners, 
and relatively less of the cash will be available to finance their transactions. More cash will be 
needed to support the same level of activity in the underground economy, implying a still lower 
velocity in that sector. 
  Much of the other literature that employs currency demand modelling to estimate hidden 
incomes uses an ‘equal velocity’ assumption of some kind. However in those cases the 
assumption is that velocity of currency in the underground sector is the same as the ratio of 




studies in what constitutes money and, in common with other monetary analysis, there is a 
general broadening of the definition with time. Thus Tanzi (1983) and Schneider (1986) use the 
relatively narrow M1 measure in their studies of the USA and Denmark, respectively. (Velocity 
is the range 2-7 over the time series in the Tanzi study but not reported by Schneider.) In a 
somewhat later study of Canada, Karoleff, Mirus and Smith (1994) use the income velocity of 
an M2 measure of money for the same purpose. More recently, Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002) 
prefer a money aggregate that is even broader than M3 in their study of Spain, and which has an 
average income velocity of 1.15. Both Klovland (1984) for Sweden, and Hill and Kabir (2000) 
for Canada, discuss the direct and indirect evidence for the velocity of currency in the 
underground economy of their respective countries, and both consider that a range of 2-7 will 
cover the possibilities. Most of the literature cited in these latter two studies argues for a broad 
definition of money in the observed economy to be used as the comparator to currency in the 
hidden sector, and hence it argues for values at the lower end of the velocity range, i.e. values 
around two. 
  Against these considerations, the implied value of velocity of 24-30 in the Bajada estimates 
is seen to be many times too high. Since the estimate of the underground economy is in direct 
proportion to the assumed velocity, the estimate also is too high by the same factor. If a more 
sustainable value for velocity were to be used, the same calculations based on ‘excess 
sensitivity’ would yield an estimate of underground income, not around 15 per cent, but instead 
around one or two percent of observed GDP. 
IX Conclusions 
  The method of ‘excess sensitivity’ employed by Bajada (1999, 2001, 2002) indicates a 
large underground economy in Australia, with an estimate of hidden income around 15 per cent 
of GDP. But the method is unsound, because a simple change in the units of measurement will 
produce a completely different estimate. The effect of units is not trivial, since a rescaling of the 
tax variable from a percentage to a decimal fraction will cause the estimate of underground 
income to change from large and positive to large and negative (and hence be meaningless). 
The measure of ‘excess sensitivity’ can be immunized against changes in the units of 
measurement, but the respecification necessarily produces an estimate that is, at best, trivially 
small. 
  Some warning signs about the methodology can be seen in the empirical results. Despite its 




economy is almost entirely a mathematically transformed version of income tax payments 
relative to GDP. The calculation comes from static predictions using the fitted regression, with 
no reference to the dynamic properties of the error-correction model that is estimated. The 
published estimate has to be treated with a strong and arbitrary moving-average filter, without 
which the estimate is highly seasonal and erratic, even though the tax variable on which it is 
based is already deseasonalized in the data file. 
  Separately from the problems of measuring ‘excess sensitivity’, the value that is assumed 
for the income velocity of currency is many times too high to be plausible. The resulting 
estimate of underground economic activity in Australia is incredible on that account alone. 
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Appendix 
  Dr Christopher Bajada provided me with the file of data I have used in this paper. I have 
not been able to check the data fully against the original ABS sources, because the national 
accounts have been revised extensively in recent years (including new methods of adjusting for 
price movements and a rebasing of the price indices), and the pages of AusStats have been 
rearranged. With a couple of exceptions noted below, the data items in the file are likely to be 
what were available from the ABS at the time. Some of the univariate results in the original 
paper can be replicated with the data in this file, but other calculations including the regression 
results require additional data. 
  Subsequent to submission of the final version of my paper, I received additional data from 
Christopher Bajada. These data have enabled me to replicate the basic regression results in 
Bajada (1999, Table 3, p.376). 
  The comparison between the data in the file and ABS sources reveals a feature of the data 
that is not documented in the original paper. The tax variable in the file is not the quarterly data 
as described in Bajada (1999, Appendix) and as published on AusStats but instead a new 
variable that appears to have been constructed by replacing the value in each quarter by the 




all the other variables, is obtained from seasonally adjusted ABS sources. The latter variable is 
not used in the present paper. 
  A copy of the data file has been lodged with the editors of the Economic Record. The 
percentage tax and welfare variables used in the calculation of ‘excess sensitivity’ in this paper 
are constructed from the items in the data file as follows: 
  100 ( / ) TT a x G D P =× ,  ( ) 100 ( ) W Welf GDP Tax Welf =× −+  
where Tax is called T in the data file, Welf is called W, and GDP is called GDP(I). 
  A previous version of this paper was, of necessity, based on an extract of ABS data to 
match as nearly as possible the descriptions of data items given in Bajada (1999, Appendix). 
When I originally requested the data from the author I was told they were lost. The editors of 
the Economic Record were unable to supply the original data, despite the paper that used it 
being published in a volume of the journal that bears inside its cover the statement 
It is the policy of the Economic Record to foster the replicability of empirical results by other 
researchers. Accordingly, the Economic Record normally publishes papers only where the data used 
in the analysis are clearly and precisely documented, are available to others to enable replication of 
results, and where details of the computations sufficient for replication are provided. 
and which contains in its instructions to authors the requirement 
If the paper presents analysis of data, it should be accompanied by a computer disk with data files which enable 
a referee to replicate both the construction of the data and the results. A hard copy of the requisite 
documentation should be attached. 
According to the current editor, the manuscript for the original paper would have entered the 
review process before the policy on submitting data was adopted. That is perhaps 
understandable in a period of transition, but misleading. Statements that in effect promote the 
quality of the journal’s contents should apply to the current issue of the journal, not just to the 



















































































































Source: See Section V and Appendix. 
 
 
 
 